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CASENOTES 
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Petitioner who was engaged in a wholly intrastate activity, the 
bakery business, at Santa Rosa, New Mexico, brought an action 
for treble damages.1 The corporate respondent was a Clovis, 
New Mexico, bakery which sold bread in interstate commerce. 
Respondent was one of several corporations having interlocking 
ownership and management, all marketing bread under a common 
name. The syndicate promoted the product through a common 
advertising program and purchased supplies as a unit. Respon-
. dent, claiming petitioner had instigated a boycott against it, cut 
the price of bread by one-half in Santa Rosa, thereby driving 
the petitioner out of business, but did not cut prices at other 
locations. The court of appeals reversed the trial court judgment 
for petitioner upon the ground that the injury was to a purely 
local competitor whose business was in no way related to inter-
state commerce.2 Upon appeal to the United States Supreme 
Court, held: reversed. Although the victim was a local merchant 
and no interstate transactions were used to destroy him, the ag-
gressor was an interstate business. The treasury used to finance 
the warfare was drawn from interstate as well as local sources.3 
1 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952). The action was brought 
for violation of § 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, H Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 u.s.c. § 13a (1952) and of § 
3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a 
(1952). 
21\fead's Fine Bread Co. v. l\foore, 208 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1953). 
3 Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). 
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Congress enacted the antitrust laws by virtue of its con-
stitutional power to regulate commerce among the states.4 The 
definition of "commerce" in the antitrust laws is virtually the 
same as in the constitutional grant.5 The respondent's activities 
seem to fall within the prohibitions of the antitrust laws ;6 how-
ever, the laws can have no greater potency than the commerce 
clause of the Constitution. The wrongs complained of must in-
volve commerce "among the several states" in such a way as to 
fall within the scope of the federal power. The interstate ele-
ment seems lacking in the instant case. 
The Supreme Court in establishing the limits of federal power 
has defined certain situations which involve interstate commerce 
to a degree sufficient to permit the exercise of congressional con-
trol. The most common situation is where intrastate activity 
has an undesired effect on interstate commerce.7 It has been 
held that Congress can regulate (1) activity which interferes with 
-i U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8. 
o 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1952). 
GSection 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person 
engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or 
indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases 
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities 
are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States . . . . 
and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to 
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants 
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with cus-
tomers of either of them . . . ." Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 
49 Stat. 1526, (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952) provides in part: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, . . . to sell . . . goods in any part of the United States 
at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United 
States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a com-
petitor in such part of the United States; or, to sell ... goods at un-
reasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or elim-
inating a competitor." 
7 Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 
219 (1948); Wickard v. Filburn 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); National Labor Relations 
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937); Local 167 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 
(1934); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); 
Houston, E. & w. T. R.R. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern 
Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911); Swift & Co. v. United States, 
196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
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the exercise of federal power ;8 (2) control of "production for 
interstate commerce" ;9 ( 3) intrastate activities which are a part 
of the "stream of commerce" ;10 (4) a conspiracy to control pur-
chase of goods, thus limiting the interstate market;11 (5) intra-
state commodities and transactions inextricably comingled with 
interstate commerce ;12 ( 6) sales and transportation of goods 
restricted by the laws of the state of destination ;13 (7) sales and 
transportation of goods conceived to be injurious to the public 
health, morals, or welfare even though the state of destination 
has not sought to regulate their use.14 
The present case reaches the outer boundary of federal power 
in holding that a strictly intrastate situation which has no effect 
on interstate commerce can be controlled through the commerce 
clause because the profits and finances of an interstate organ-
ization are used to attain an end the antitrust laws seek to pro-
hibit. The Court's construction of the commerce clause in this 
case seems to support the liberal view of one authority who states 
that the intent of the framers of the constitution was to define the 
power as plenary over all commerce and who rejects the "inter-
state" limitation.1° 
Hal W. Bauer, '56 
s United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); Houston. 
E. & W. T. R.R. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Second Employers 
Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 
1824). ~ 
9 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
10 Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923); Stafford v. 
Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 
375 (1905); cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). 
11 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). 
12 Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 
(1939); United States v. New York Central R.R., 272 U.S. 457, 464 
(1926); Houston, E. & W. T. R.R. 234 U.S. 342 (1914). 
13 Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Ry., 299 U.S. 334 
(1937). 
H Hoke & Economides v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Hipolite 
Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911); Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 
(1903). 
101 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, Part I (1953). 
